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ABSTRACT 
Land reform was introduced in South Africa in the 1990s to redress the injustices of colonialism 
and apartheid. But compromises in the transition to democracy saw a trade-off between political 
participation on one side and continuity in economic structure and ownership on the other. 
Conflicting policy imperatives led to the subordination of land reform to agricultural restructuring, 
which was already producing the consolidation of corporate power at the centre of the agri-food 
system. Key processes included the privatisation of the co-operative infrastructural backbone to 
produce concentrated agribusinesses throughout the food system, trade liberalisation that 
benefited some agri-food sectors and saw the decline of others, and foreign investments and 
acquisitions across the agri-food system – most recently in the Pioneer-Pannar and Walmart-
Massmart acquisitions. Despite rhetoric in favour of building small-scale agriculture, neither the 
land reform programme nor agricultural restructuring processes facilitated the realisation of this 
objective. Government tailed agribusiness in opting for a contract farming model to integrate 
selected small-scale black farmers into corporate value chains, which left the fundamental agrarian 
and agri-food structure intact. Government’s role in providing black farmers with finance, research 
and development support and extension services remain weak and enhance private control over 
the overall agri-food system. 
 




Thanks to PLAAS colleagues Andries du Toit, Ruth Hall and Ben Cousins for comments on earlier 
drafts.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Land reform was introduced into South Africa in the 1990s in part in order to rebalance the 
highly racially-skewed distribution of access that was a consequence of violent dispossession 
and apartheid. However the democratically-elected government sought economic continuity at 
the same time. Efforts to realise these divergent objectives – redress of past injustice and 
economic continuity – produced contradictions in land and agricultural policy. Later, land 
reform became more closely tied to productive use and agribusiness began to shape the agenda 
more explicitly. In the process, the redistributive and justice elements of land reform have 
become increasingly subordinated to the logic of capital and its economic imperatives. 
 
Commercial farmers were one of the social bases on which the National Party (NP)’s rise to 
power (O’Meara, 1996). The gradual decline of the political and economic power of commercial 
farmers as agriculture became less important in the political economy accelerated with the 
removal of the NP from state power following the first democratic elections in 1994. Economic 
crisis and the changing base of political power meant the authority of commercial farmers in the 
state was showing weaknesses in the 1980s. Although the NP was given the agricultural 
portfolio after 1994, this was primarily to ease the transition to a formal disconnection between 
the commercial agriculture lobby and the state (Bayley, 2000). This does not mean the lobby did 
not continue to exert influence over policy, but just that it no longer had a formal role in policy 
formulation. 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) bought in to a restructuring process that was already well 
under way by the time the ANC took political control of the state in 1994. This restructuring 
included deregulation and liberalisation, and favoured export-oriented producers and 
agribusinesses. Smaller, often less efficient white family farmers who had relied heavily on state 
subsidies for their prosperity and survival during apartheid were the main losers in the 
commercial sector. Increasing economies of scale became the mantra. 
 
Land reform was not motivated primarily by economic imperatives. That is to say, land reform 
was not a necessary component of economic restructuring and would not have been put on the 
agenda if it was not for the political or justice imperatives. This put it on a collision course with 
the highly-capitalised and entrenched large-scale commercial farming sector. Private 
landowners benefited in the political negotiations when the right to property was protected in 
the new Constitution, even if other constituencies (e.g. mining interests) secured this protection. 
The design of the land reform programme had to fit into this protection and the framework that 
emerged was the willing buyer, willing seller principle which retained the integrity of private 
property. Thus, although commercial farmer influence in the state declined, private property 
constraints allowed them to retain some control over the pace and direction of land reform 
simply by choosing whether to sell or not and for how much. 
 
The result of these broad political and economic processes was a disconnection between 
political efforts to widen the base of land ownership, and economic tendencies towards 
concentration of land and agricultural assets. Land reform took place at the margins of the 
agricultural economy, with land transferred to large groups who were then expected to 
continue using it productively. The consequence was a string of weak interventions that not 
only did not ensure support for productive use of land, but also constrained the rapid 
redistribution of land. After 1999 the government began considering how to combine land 
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attempts to create a black commercial farming class that could compete with large-scale 
commercial white farmers. However this failed to produce any meaningful change in the 
structure or distribution of productive resources given the social and economic structure 
throughout the agri-food system. 
 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994), which was the ANC’s 
programme for transformation released at the time of the first democratic elections, referred in 
part to support for small-scale farmers, as did the ANC’s agricultural policy guidelines of the 
same time (ANC, 1994a). However, these were only fragments of a much broader and not 
entirely coherent vision, and little effort was put into reviving or recreating a black small-scale 
farming class that had been decimated many decades previously by prejudicial state 
interventions (see Bundy, 1988). It was only much later – in the mid-2000s - that it became 
apparent to the state and the ANC that neither land redistribution on its own nor expecting new 
black farmers to compete with their entrenched white counterparts without additional support 
would result in significantly greater black involvement in the agricultural economy. The notion 
of small-scale agriculture was given a new lease of life. This push came from multiple angles. 
Civil society organisations, especially non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who were 
working with black communities to get and then use land, saw that small-scale agriculture was 
closer to the needs of their constituencies than the imposition of a large-scale commercial 
model. This coincided with renewed interest in support for small-scale agriculture in Africa by 
the World Bank (2008) and other multinational entities1, which gave government an opening to 
shift in that direction. The ANC’s 52nd National Conference in 2007 indicated that a similar sift 
was underway within the ranks of the ruling party. The explosions around land in Zimbabwe 
also gave the private sector and agribusinesses pause for thought about what the lack of 
transformation in South African land and agricultural structure might mean in future. They 
therefore embraced a model that sought to integrate small-scale producers into niche markets 
as profitable businesses. 
 
In this paper I consider the interconnections between land reform, small-scale farmer support 
and conceptualisation, and the rise of a corporate agri-food regime in South Africa. The paper 
looks at the contradictions and disjunctures in government policy, and at the ways in which 
corporate power is driving the mainstream agenda around land reform and black farmer 
support. I start with an overview of agri-food regimes and the application of this concept to the 
South African system of agri-food production and distribution. I attempt to delineate some key 
aspects of changes in the agri-food system in South Africa, focusing on the privatisation of the 
co-operatives, governance and regulation around trade and marketing, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the agri-food system.  
 
I then consider land reform in relation to the changing agri-food regime, and proceed to look at 
how small-scale agriculture is being thought about in South Africa by different actors. I then 
highlight the contradictions between government rhetoric and practice in supporting black 
small-scale farmers with a focus on credit, extension services and research and development 
(R&D), and reveals how land reform and small-scale agricultural policy are increasingly being 
drawn into the orbit of the dense corporate agribusiness core. It will become apparent that I 
believe there is an important role for small-scale farming in South Africa, both as an antidote to 
increasing corporate concentration but also as a route to involving many more people in the 
economy, not just as passive consumers but as active agents and decision-makers. Agricultural 
                                                             
1 For example the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) set up by the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations 
(www.agra.org), or the US government’s Feed the Future initiative (www.feedthefuture.gov), amongst many others. 
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restructuring has produced a small intensive core at the heart of the agri-food economy. But this 
also offers opportunities for restructuring the large periphery in ways that might produce 
greater social justice and economic opportunity. 
  
2. AGRI-FOOD REGIMES AND CORPORATE CONCENTRATION IN 
THE AGRI-FOOD SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
An agri-food regime can be defined as a relatively long-lived set of institutional arrangements 
and social relations governing the production, distribution and consumption of agricultural 
products and food, linked to forms of accumulation globally (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989). 
Very schematically, three global eras can be defined historically. The first food regime was 
centred on European imports of wheat and meat from settler states, and the export of 
manufactured goods, labour and capital to these states between 1870 and 1914. This 
contributed to the culmination of colonialism and the rise of the nation-state system. 
Comparative advantage in the production of some agricultural products amongst colonised 
states created the first international division of labour in agriculture and underpinned a new 
phase of industrial development as industrial capital appropriated phases of the agricultural 
production process (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989).  
 
The global food regime in the period of US hegemony (from around the Second World War to 
the early 1970s) was underpinned by the replication of the US national agricultural model in 
other countries and the integration of national markets into a global agri-food system. 
Replication included the development of livestock-grain complexes and the introduction of 
national, publically-resourced research and development centres. Integration took place on the 
basis of national regulation, import controls and subsidised export of surplus commodities, and 
imports of US feed, equipment and chemical inputs (Friedmann, 1993). 
 
A third, corporate, food regime (McMichael, 2005), from the 1970s until the present, is 
characterised by increasingly global regulation first through the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) and then the World Trade Organisation (WTO), trade driven by import 
demand from Asia rather than subsidised exports especially after 1991, a more polycentric 
trade regime where countries trade more with one another and the role of the US is reduced 
(although by no means eliminated), a growing emphasis on agro-industry in some countries 
(e.g. Brazil, Argentina, China and other Asian countries) to support local production of inputs 
rather than imports both for agricultural production and for agro-processing (Friedmann, 
1993). An “unprecedented conversion of agriculture across the world to supply a relatively 
affluent global consumer class” (McMichael, 2005:277) and a convergence in patterns of 
consumption characterises the downstream end of corporate food regime. This is closely linked 
to the rising control of finance capital and the subordination of food restructuring in indebted 
third world countries to the repayment of international debts through agricultural exports 
(Friedmann, 1993). Critically, it also includes a shift from nation-state to private, corporate 
regulation (McMichael, 2005). Deregulation, new technologies in food processing, and 
information technology giving rise to fundamental changes in logistics and supply chain 
management all advance the power of food retailers. Buyers gained power in commodity chains 
as a result of deregulation by government (including in finance) and reregulation favouring the 
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Agri-food regimes are not necessarily stable and may have fundamental contradictions. But 
instability and contradictions are managed for a time through a dynamic set of institutional and 
social relations and distributions of power. The concept of a regime is used to discuss the 
connections between the social structure of accumulation in the agri-food system and broader 
processes of capital accumulation at a global level. But it has implications for national agri-food 
structure and processes of change. The regime defines the global context in which national level 
agri-food system change and restructuring takes place. Gelb (1991:11) defines a national 
growth model as the specific expression of the regime of accumulation within the boundaries of 
a single nation state. National systems are integrated into global systems functioning to produce 
and circulate food, and therefore adopt at least some of the mechanisms and systems of 
operation of the latter. 
 
There have been some critiques of the regimes approach. With reference to agriculture, these 
are mainly based on the limited value of the uncritical application of industrial restructuring 
literature to the agri-food system. Goodman and Watts (1994) are particularly critical of 
attempts to apply the Fordist/post-Fordist couplet to far more heterogenous processes of 
agrarian change. They also question whether a descriptive list of attributes is adequate to assert 
the existence of a new regime of accumulation. They propose that the pitfalls of using the 
Fordist/post-Fordist binary might be circumvented by asking how the organisation of 
agricultural production and rural space change under different regimes of accumulation and 
modes of social regulation (Goodman & Watts, 1994:15). Criticisms notwithstanding, there does 
seem to be some value, and significance, in developing broad categorisations that can explain 
the structuring and restructuring of production and consumption relations. 
Corporate concentration in South Africa 
Every country has a unique pattern of development. National systems form the basis for the 
circulation of capital globally, and are in turn shaped by these global flows. South African 
industrialisation was based on the discovery of gold and the importance of gold in the global 
economy in the era of British hegemony. Subsequent development relied on imported 
technologies from Europe and the US in particular. In agriculture, South African development 
was closely linked to developments outlined in the second food regime above, i.e. the 
construction of a livestock-grain complex at the centre of a national production system, the 
creation of a national research and development infrastructure, and heavy reliance on imported 
chemicals and capital equipment to increase yields and facilitate capital accumulation. Similarly, 
the agri-food system (defined as the social structures and mechanisms of regulation that enable 
the accumulation of capital through the production and distribution of agri-food commodities) 
has undergone similar shifts to those described in the third, corporate regime. 
 
Agriculture in South Africa has undergone significant restructuring since the 1980s in 
particular, although the roots can be traced to financial deregulation in the late 1970s as a result 
of the De Kock Commission (Bayley, 2000). This was coupled with a deregulatory stance 
following the 1972 Reynders Commission which suggested a shift from an import substitution 
strategy to an export orientation (O’Meara, 1996:178). During this period, South Africa 
experienced an economic slowdown that turned into an ‘organic crisis’ in the 1980s (Gelb, 
1991), leading to efforts to reduce state expenditure, including privatisation and limitations on 
state subsidies. These broader processes affected agriculture. 
 
South Africa has a sophisticated agricultural production system integrated into the broader 
economy. This was built historically on the basis of extensive state support to white agriculture 
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and the growth of an ‘agricultural nomenklatura’ (Bayley, 2000), a privileged caste of officials 
drawn from the agricultural sector representing the interests of white commercial agriculture 
deep in the state and its proxies in the control boards and co-operatives. 
 
Agricultural restructuring was already well under way at the time of negotiations for political 
democratisation in the early 1990s, part of longer processes driven by the needs of a 
‘modernising’ elite within commercial agriculture who sought to expand markets with less state 
regulation, and the rising power of the retail corporations which supported deregulation. These 
processes tied in to what came to be termed neo-liberal restructuring on a global level, 
characterised by financial deregulation and the rising power of financial capital, withdrawal of 
the state from direct interventions in production and marketing, and trade liberalisation. By the 
time political power was transferred to the ANC, these processes were very advanced within 
South Africa. 
 
Thus although the link between the commercial agricultural lobby and the state was formally 
broken with political democratisation, this nomeklatura retained significant power in shaping 
the direction of agricultural and broader agrarian change, primarily in the form of assertion of 
their exclusive technical expertise. This took the form of an emphasis on the continuation of 
large-scale commercial production as the basis for national food security. It found echoes in the 
Congress movement’s general Stalinist antipathy towards small-scale agriculture and the 
peasantry and support for large-scale centralised production systems (Habib et al., 1998). 
 
 Proposals for reform of agriculture included reducing state involvement, including a decrease 
in budget transfers and deregulation of parts of the marketing system: removal of price controls 
and subsidies on some products, abolition of import controls, the reform or abolition of 
production quota systems, closure of some control boards, elimination of some single channel 
marketing schemes and other reforms all occurred before 1994 (Bayley, 2000:41). These were 
reinforced by South Africa’s signing of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) in 1993. 
 
After 1994 these processes were continued, culminating in the overhaul of marketing legislation 
with the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 1996. According to Bayley (2000:44) this was 
sparked by concern that concentrated food markets coincided with the existence of statutory 
controls. However, as with post-1994 competition policy, the new marketing laws did not break 
down existing concentration but rather opened competition for others.  The passage of the Act 
removed any statutory basis on which black farmers could be given any special status in 
agricultural policy (Jacobs, 2009). In most instances small-scale producers anywhere along the 
value chains were not able to compete except in some niches. On the other hand, marketing 
reforms and liberalisation opened concentrated domestic industry to global competition where 
much larger entities were able to compete or acquire local businesses. The practical result was 
thus support for growing concentration as the growth model, despite Bayley’s claims that it was 
concern about over-concentration that stimulated reform. This can be shown in a number of 
areas, viz. privatisation of the co-ops without breaking up their concentrated power; trade and 
investment policy; and the marginal role in agricultural policy for small-scale farmer support, 
despite the political rhetoric. 
Privatisation of the co-operatives 
Co-operatives formed the institutional backbone of commercial agriculture in South Africa from 
the early 1920s, and under apartheid the co-ops were given a key role in managing statutory 
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practice they came to function throughout value chains, from input and credit supply to 
distribution, sales and exports (Amin & Bernstein, 1996; Competition Commission, 2006:27). 
 
Following the passage of the Co-operatives Amendment Act of 1993, permitting co-ops to 
expand their range of business and to convert into private companies, 90% of commercial co-
ops converted to companies (Sikuka, 2010:12). Major mergers and acquisitions followed around 
the core of the former co-ops (Competition Commission, 2006 and various Competition 
Commission cases). The most notable of these include the formation of Pioneer Foods in 1997 
following the privatisation and merging of Sasko (focus on milling and baking) and Bokomo 
(poultry, eggs, animal feeds and breakfast foods). Pioneer Foods went on to expand and 
diversify its range of business, including the acquisition of SAD Holdings in 2002, Golden Lay in 
2004, John Moir’s (a division of Bromor Foods) in 2004, and Ceres (including brands Liqui-Fruit, 
Ceres and Fruitree) in 2007 to name a few. It is now one of the biggest four agri-food companies 
in the country. 
 
Other prime examples are Afgri (the former Oos Transvaalse Ko-op – OTK) and Senwes (former 
Sentral-Wes Ko-op) which both operate across numerous markets including trading of 
agricultural commodities, handling and storage facilities, marketing of farming equipment, 
manufacture and distribution of animal feeds, operating retail outlets, and financial services 
(Competition Commission, 2008:61). After OTK’s conversion into Afgri, the company expanded 
its activities and made a number of acquisitions, including Laeveld Ko-op (2002), Natal 
Agricultural Co-op and Nedan Oil Mills (2004), Daybreak Farms (2005), Rossgro Chickens in 
2010 and Pride Milling in 2011. Senwes currently owns 25% of South Africa’s grain storage 
capacity. It recently entered into a joint venture with Bunge to form Bunge Senwes Africa, 
approved by the competition authorities in 2011. Bunge is one of the world’s largest commodity 
traders, and the world’s largest handler of soybeans (ACB, 2011). Senwes’s African footprint 
was a key factor in the formation of the joint venture. Afgri is also venturing into Africa, and 
currently has a presence in DRC, Zimbabwe and Zambia (Afgri, 2012). In 2013 Afgri and Senwes 
merged their wholesale and retail businesses in a joint venture (Competition Tribunal, 2013) 
called Hinterland.  
 
Another example of agri-food concentration built on the back of the former co-ops is in the wine 
sector. Wine is currently South Africa’s largest agricultural export industry. Following 
deregulation in the 1990s, the wine industry was the site of major contestation over control of 
the pool of assets, involving KWV, South African Breweries (SAB) and the state, which resulted 
in the merger of Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (SFW), a co-op, and Distillers, a private company, 
to form a new company called Distell in 2000 (NAMC, 2002:18-19). Distell now dominates the 
wine sector as a buyer and processor. KWV has now become Capevin Holdings, an investment 
holding company with a 50% stake in Remgro-Capevin Investments Ltd, which in turn has a 
58% share ownership in Distell2.  
 
Other significant companies emerging from co-ops include Capespan in the citrus and deciduous 
fruit industries, as well as NWK, Kaap Agri and VKB, all mainly with regional power. Kaap Agri is 
assessed as being the controlling shareholder of Pioneer Foods mentioned above (McGregor’s, 
2012). Zeder Investments has a significant financial stake in many former co-ops, including 
Kaap Agri, MGK Investments (formerly Magaliesburg Grain Co-op), Suidwes Investments 
(arising from Suidwes Co-op in parts of the Free State and North West provinces), Overberg 
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Agri, Tuinroete Agri, OVK and NWK (Zeder, 2011). Zeder is an investment holding company 
controlled by PSG Group Ltd, a private equity company ultimately controlled by Jannie Mouton 
and Arch Equity (McGregor’s, 2012:474). Mouton is also a Director at Pioneer Foods and 
Steinhoff International, and had a net worth of US$400m at the end of 2012, according to 
Forbes3. In 2011, Zeder acquired majority control of Capespan (Competition Tribunal, 2011). In 
2012 Zeder acquired controlling shares in Agricol, a plant breeding and seed company. 
 
Coupled with the consolidation of the co-ops into private companies is increasing concentration 
amongst the big agri-business conglomerates that came out of apartheid, such as Tiger Brands 
(previously part of CG Smith), Premier Foods (formerly part of Anglo-American) and Foodcorp 
(with its roots in Ruto Mills and then Fedfood). Remgro, controlled by the Rupert and Hertzog 
families, has controlling ownership of diverse companies in the agri-food system, including 
Capevin, Distell, Rainbow Chicken, TSB Sugar, and a 25% ownership of Unilever SA (McGregor’s, 
2012). Rainbow Chicken, just one of the companies in the Remgro stable, received approval 
from the competition authorities in early 2013 to acquire a majority share of Foodcorp (I-Net 
Bridge, 2013), which itself is the third largest food company in South Africa4. Johan Rupert of 
Remgro had a net worth estimated at US$6.6bn in March 20135. Concentration in input supply 
(especially commercial seed) and food retailing are spelled out elsewhere (ACB, 2009; 
Greenberg, 2010).  
 
This concentration also produces rapidly increasing returns on assets (i.e. profit or surplus 
extraction). For example Tiger Brands’ margin in milling and baking rose from 15% in 2003 to 
42% in 2006 at a time of rapidly rising food prices for consumers (Competition Commission, 
2008:35). Concentration brought with it many forms of abuse of market power, from collusion 
and price fixing in fertilisers, bulk grain storage, baking, milling and dairy (Rakhudu & Bodibe, 
2008) to retaining high food prices at retail level even after farm gate prices have dropped 
(Cutts & Kirsten, 2006). 
 
Concentration throughout value chains affects primary production. The purpose of agricultural 
deregulation was to modernise the agricultural sector, shaking out those on the margins (on the 
assumption that these would be inefficient white farmers who had survived on the back of state 
protection) and enabling those at the centre to consolidate ownership of assets in the name of 
greater efficiency and lower consumer prices. Primary production experienced a decline from 
61,000 to 40,000 commercial units between 1996 and 2007 (DAFF, 2012:6), and 20% of 
producers now generate 80% of output value (Kirsten, 2011:16). Liebenberg (2013:28) shows 
that while private companies owned just 0.6% of farm units in 2007 (237 farm units), these 
units generated 33.5% of total income in that year. 
 
Many might question why economic concentration should be a problem. After all, economies of 
scale are seen as more efficient and are necessary for survival in the face of global competition. 
This is the dominant commercial view: ‘get big or get out’. This logic is therefore one that sees 
small-scale production as a hang-over from the past, and government policy encourages 
centralisation and concentration in the name of efficiency and lower food prices. However, as 
Aliber (2013) has suggested, over-centralisation and over-concentration may cause 
inefficiencies in some supply chains. It also reinforces passivity rather than agency amongst 
large numbers of people and intensifies social inequality. 
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Trade and investment policy 
Concentration in domestic agri-food markets is intensified with the opening up of the economy 
to global competition. In this competitive environment, it is necessary to grow in order to 
compete. The apartheid government adopted a policy of self-sufficiency, both to protect 
domestic industry but also in light of sanctions against South Africa especially after the 
Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Agri-food multinationals operated in South Africa under 
apartheid, for example Pioneer Hi-Bred and Monsanto in the seed sector, and Unilever, Coca-
Cola, Nestle and Del Monte in the food sector. These companies were able to use their presence 
to consolidate their power after 1994, and liberalisation and deregulation saw a rapid 
expansion of multinational involvement. 
 
With deregulation came a shift in policy towards a small, open economy. This became feasible in 
the context of the political resolution and political democratisation. It led to a policy shift from 
self-sufficiency to competitive advantage, with the expansion of food imports to reduce prices. 
South Africa was a signatory to the Uruguay Round of GATT which led to the formation of the 
WTO. This was negotiated before political democratisation, and saw the standardisation of 
trade regulation into tariffs which were to be reduced over time, and the opening of markets to 
some tariff-free entry. South Africa is part of the Cairns Group of exporting countries that 
lobbies for reducing tariffs and opening agricultural markets. The result was a smooth 
transition in trade liberalisation policy from late apartheid to the early democratic era, with 
agriculture under the helm of an NP representative. Thus the momentum of reforms started in 
the 1980s carried through. 
 
The ANC in government emphasised the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) to revive 
the circulation of capital in South Africa. Combined with trade liberalisation, this emphasis 
facilitated multinational expansion in South Africa’s agri-food system and growing investment 
in companies across the board by global equity and hedge funds. This investment is both direct 
and indirect, e.g. Standard Bank is now a major investor in food companies, and in turn is 20% 
owned by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. The result is a gradual dilution of local 
ownership. In such conditions, estimates of (often short term) profitability engulf political 
support for small-scale production or transformation and profits flow out of the country over 
time. There may be recognition by these investors or companies of government’s BEE policies 
and requirements, but this is locked into a corporate strategic orientation and has little to do 
with transformation of the economic structure beyond (minority) ownership or (commercially-
defined) skills development of the workforce. 
 
The result is growing foreign control of South African agri-food companies, including Illovo 
(Associated British Foods), Massmart (Walmart), Pannar (Pioneer Hi-Bred) and SABMiller 
(Philip Morris). Walmart’s entry into South African food retail is likely to stimulate further 
foreign acquisitions. Pick n Pay is the subject of ongoing rumours that it is next in line for 
acquisition. Speculation has identified Tesco from the UK and Woolworths from Australia (not 
related to the South African company of the same name) as potential buyers (IOL Business, 
2011; Business Live, 2012). In June 2012 the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
purchased Spar shares and 54% of Woolworths’ shares are already owned by foreign funds 
(Business Live, 2012a). As with SABMiller, one of South Africa’s largest companies that was 
bought out by external interests, acquisitions at this level are driven by global competition and 
concentration with limited concern for domestic production or sourcing beyond that stipulated 
in government policy. This is the climate in which land reform and small-scale agricultural 
policies and plans are being formulated.  
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3. THREE BROAD PHASES OF LAND REFORM 
The first phase 1994-1999: On a wing and a prayer 
Up to 1999 land reform was basically designed to get groups of former dispossessed people 
onto the land, using the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). The mechanism was to 
acquire commercial farms on sale by willing sellers (i.e. using a market-based process) for 
transfer to beneficiaries. The latter were generally groups because individual grants were not 
enough to buy land, so grants were pooled. Land redistribution was heavily constrained by the 
need to buy the land first, and limited resources and know-how to use the land productively, or 
even for settlement, once acquired. 
 
The focus of restitution was on returning people to the land they had been forced off in the past. 
Sometimes there were large numbers of people. Although laws and policies very clearly defined 
land owning institutions (communal property institutions in the form of Communal Property 
Associations (CPAs) or Trusts), there were seldom detailed or defined institutional 
arrangements for production. Support to create business plans was often provided (through 
outsourcing to private consultants who had no stake in the outcome), but these were based on a 
commercial model of farming and the expectation was that beneficiaries would work on the 
farms collectively and distribute the proceeds fairly amongst themselves. 
 
The experience was that few beneficiaries moved onto the land, and those who did had limited 
resources for production or even to establish settlements with acceptable standards (e.g. with 
water, electricity, housing, access to health care facilities and schools) (Hall, 2007). This was 
made worse by the failure of government institutions to transfer grants that were meant to 
assist in getting business plans going. This problem was by no means limited to the first phase 
of restitution. In the middle of 2010, government owed R3.4 billion in outstanding payments of 
post-settlement grants to restitution claimants (Phakathi, 2010). This produced widespread 
conflict and infighting with no conflict resolution support forthcoming, and many CPAs became 
dysfunctional6. The basis of restitution was the return of land to large groups of people, and this 
underpinned intractable problems in relation to productive use of the land. 
 
On commercial farms, two main approaches were adopted in the first phase. First, labour 
legislation was extended onto commercial farms for the first time, encouraging processes of 
modernisation of commercial agriculture and a shift from paternalist relations between 
workers and land owners/farm managers to an arm’s-length corporate human relations model 
(du Toit, 1992). This was uneven, and built on the premise that farm workers would be able to 
organise into trade unions to secure their rights. However, this was not to be. Restructuring of 
agriculture led to a reduction in the permanent workforce, and this was coupled with the 
increasing use of precarious labour (casual, seasonal and labour contracting) and the movement 
of workers off farms as a mobile workforce located in informal settlements around rural towns 
(Ewert & Hamman, 1996; CRLS, 2003; du Toit & Ally, 2003). Unions and other worker support 
organisations faced tremendous difficulties in organising workers both on farms (e.g. distances 
between farms, lack of access, inappropriate union strategies based on recruitment of male, full-
time workers) and off farms (fragmentation of the workforce and a multiplication of livelihood 
strategies that splintered and shifted identities). The trade union model is also not necessarily 
the most appropriate organising form on farms, where work and home issues are combined. 
Workers encountered many fly-by-night operations, paying membership fees and then never 
seeing their supposed representatives again. The unions on the farms tended to operate on a 
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top-down organising model. The overall result was limited organisation on farms and thus 
limited ability for workers to secure their legal rights. 
 
From a land point of view, legislation in the form of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 
(ESTA) was passed to secure the tenure of some categories of farm dwellers: those who had 
lived on the farm for more than 10 years and who had reached the age of 60 could remain on the 
farm until death. The law meant to regulate evictions, but allowed evictions for business 
purposes (i.e. if the land owner was ‘modernising’ their operations and workers were no longer 
needed). Contrary to intentions, the law exacerbated the trend to moving the workforce off 
farms. Wegerif et al. (2005) showed that more workers were evicted between 1994 and 2004 
than acquired land through land reform. 
 
The Labour Tenants Act (LTA) was passed in the first phase to secure ownership of land to 
those who had historical labour tenant rights. Labour tenancy is mainly concentrated in 
southern Mpumalanga and northern KwaZulu-Natal, and the law applied to a relatively small 
number of farm dwellers. There was very limited land transferred through this programme and 
high rates of evictions or threats of eviction in these areas. No legislation was passed to enable 
farm dwellers on commercial farms to gain secure access to land for production and form part 
of the base of small-scale farmers. Although land reform policy mentioned farm workers as a 
target group, this did not materialise. 
 
The communal areas, where up to 40% of South Africa’s population still live (Hemson, et al., 
2004:5), witnessed the collapse of the formal tenure system based on the Permission to Occupy 
(PTO) certificates under apartheid, where traditional authorities worked with magistrates to 
allocate land. Given the deep roots of this system, it persisted even though it had no legal 
foundation. But it was not replaced with any other system. This related to the role of chiefs in 
the ANC’s political logic, which was at least partly one of control of political power in the rural 
areas. The formation of the Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa (Contralesa) 
spearheaded ANC efforts to draw traditional authorities into the ambit of the ANC (Ntsebeza, 
2005). The first phase saw a policy blockage as these building blocks of a new coalition of social 
forces were put in place.  
The Mbeki era circa 1999-2007: Modernisation and market 
triumphalism 
During the Mbeki era, the focus of land reform shifted from the welfare-type group projects 
characterising the first phase towards an orientation on land reform for commercial production. 
This took the form of the Land for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. LRAD 
emphasised individual and household beneficiaries for redistribution, although restitution 
remained stuck in the group framework. LRAD beneficiaries were to be involved in the co-
financing of projects, and the model was based on entrepreneurialism with limited additional 
support. This was the heyday of neo-liberalism and the era of ‘narrow-based’ black economic 
empowerment (BEE) which the trade unions and others critiqued for using state resources to 
create a small elite at the expense of broader processes of economic democratisation (COSATU, 
2003). 
 
Later in this second phase, the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) (Presidency of 
the Republic of South Africa, 2006) had a significant influence on state strategies for rural 
development, even though it was generally more concerned with building the urban economy. 
The NSDP was essentially an argument for urbanisation and leaving rural areas to commercial 
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agriculture. It identified 26 national focal areas for concentrating investment, which were all 
urban, given the methodologies used to identify these areas (based on historical GDP). The 
NSDP argued for state support to the rural population either in the form of welfare for those 
who would not be able to leave, or training to enable those who could potentially leave to move 
to urban areas to find jobs. The NSDP incorporated a command from above for provinces, 
districts and municipalities all to follow the national lead by drawing up their own spatial 
development frameworks (SDFs), identifying nodes for priority investment. A key problem with 
the whole approach is that jobs were not being created in urban areas to absorb newcomers, 
and although the rural population is declining as a proportion of total population, it is still rising 
in real terms. Land reform was very marginal in the NSDP, and there was a clear emphasis on 
large-scale commercial production as the fundamental pillar of the rural economy. The SDFs 
were generated down to municipal level as roadmaps for investment and integrated into the 
IDPs. Even if this vision no longer holds in government, it continues to shape investment 
planning at local level in the present. 
 
On commercial farms the policy remained limited to ESTA and the LTA, with the addition of 
minimum wage legislation for farm workers, highlighting the focus on job creation through 
formal employment. There were no further efforts to transfer land to farm dwellers. There were 
some discussions on agri-villages, an approach favoured by commercial agriculture (AgriSA, 
2011). In the agri-village concept, farm dwellers were to be moved onto land purchased for the 
purpose of settlement and possibly some small-scale production/food gardens, with inhabitants 
drawn on by commercial farmers as and when required. This conjures up images of mini-
homelands conveniently located for easy access by employers. Some examples were set up, but 
generally there was no agreement and agri-villages have not yet been adopted as national policy 
(see Republic of South Africa, 2010). 
 
In the communal areas, the second phase saw the passing of the contentious Communal Land 
Rights Act (CLRA) which essentially consolidated the power of traditional authorities over their 
subjects, with traditional authorities to hold land on behalf of ‘communities’. The law was, 
however, taken to court where it was eventually struck down as unconstitutional in 20107. 
The post-Polokwane era 2007 to present: A new dawn for 
land and agrarian transformation or more of the same? 
The National Land Summit in 2005 had taken a resolution to review the ‘willing buyer, willing 
seller’ model of land reform, and identified the twin problems of slow pace of land 
redistribution and lack of productive use of the land (PMG, 2005). The third phase was launched 
with an acknowledgement of the failures of land reform, with new Rural Development and Land 
Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti being widely quoted as saying “more than 90% of [land reform 
projects] are not functional, they are not productive… That land has been given to people and 
they are not using it. No country can afford that” (quoted in Sapa, 2010). The extent of this was 
perhaps overstated and the definition of success or failure hinged on a narrow economic 
definition. Following from the Land Summit, the ANC’s 52nd National Conference in 2007 (ANC, 
2007) called for the pursuit of a small-scale farmer strategy and to need to quicken the pace of 
land reform. 
 
The Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) was developed to enable the state to buy land 
and hold it for transfer. More recently this led to policy proposals for ‘right of first refusal’ by the 
state in the 2011 Green Paper on Land Reform. The third phase saw an increase in land reform 
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budgets beyond inflation, but this is moderated in the context of the rapid escalation of land 
prices during the property boom until 2008 (Aliber, in Greenberg, 2010:5). These actions 
respond to the perceived problem of insufficient land on the market to meet demand through 
the land reform programme, and insufficient resources to purchase available land. The 
production support emphasis in the DRDLR focused on the recapitalisation of inactive land 
reform projects. 
 
These responses failed to take into account two key problems bedevilling land reform. The first 
was the deep-seated institutional problems within the DRDLR (formerly DLA), including high 
staff turnover and loss of institutional memory, insufficient staff numbers, distance from the 
ground (mainly provincial offices), internal corruption, and inefficient outsourcing of core 
functions (e.g. legal support). The second was the broader obstacle to land access that a market-
based approach engendered. Existing land owners can control the pace of land reform through 
being unwilling sellers. Either the state cannot buy the land, or it must go through long-winded 
legal procedures to acquire the land through expropriation with compensation, which is open to 
appeal all along the way. While right to first refusal gives the state more leeway, it remains 
caught in the dilemma of spending scarce resources on buying highly priced land from owners 
who have drawn decades of benefit from that land at the expense of those who were forcefully 
expropriated in the distant past. 
 
Land is much more central to Comprehensive Rural Development Strategy (CRDP) than it was in 
the earlier rural development frameworks. It emphasises land transfer to the “rural poor”, 
appropriate support for productive use of land and promotion of agricultural co-ops throughout 
value chains. However, it is also geographically constrained as the ISRDP was, and focuses on 
household and ward level interventions. In the document ‘rural development’ is understood as 
investment in economic and social infrastructure (which can well be another way of talking 
about welfare or service provision), to be implemented alongside land reform and agricultural 
support as explicit components (DRDLR, 2009). It is built around piloting (with the danger of 
more Potemkin villages), with plans to expand to another 160 sites over 5 years to reach 1.9m 
people, less than 10% of rural population (DRDLR, 2010:10). 
 
The emphasis is on ‘community-led’ approaches, a term which “may clothe a straightforward 
market-led land policy” in contrast to social movement led approaches built around a politics of 
contention (Borras & Franco, 2012:10). Target communities are identified on the basis of 
‘poverty nodes’, which inevitably are in the former homelands. From a land reform point of 
view, the focus is on improving secure access to land in communal areas, with the concentrated 
power of commercial agriculture left intact. Farm dwellers and inhabitants of informal 
settlements in commercial farming areas remain outside the programme. In this, the CRDP 
represents a continuation of the logic of the NSDP. The Green Paper on Land Reform (DRDLR, 
2011) provides a good overview of the historical context and the challenges of the past years, 
but its practical proposals tend to focus on state institutional arrangements and the paper fails 
to specify mechanisms for the redistribution of land. 
 
On commercial land, there is still no movement on considering land redistribution to farm 
dwellers on the farms they lived and worked on. The ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model means 
farm dwellers still have no possibility of gaining secure access or ownership of land where they 
live unless the land owner is willing to sell. In most cases land owners remain unwilling. For 
farm workers, land reform thus still forces a choice between wage labour on the farms and 
farming on land reform land elsewhere (if they are able to access the programme). In communal 
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areas, the striking down of the CLRA required the government to restart the process of 
developing legislation governing communal tenure. Nothing public has been released to date, 
thus continuing the vacuum that has existed since political democratisation. 
The design of land reform has not facilitated the development of small-scale agriculture, despite 
the rhetoric favouring this approach. Land has not been transferred quickly enough and 
appropriate support for the productive use of that land has not been forthcoming. In part this is 
the product of contradictory and competing conceptions of the role of small-scale agriculture. 
Instead of advancing a clear agenda, government has tended to be swayed by the most powerful 
social forces. In agriculture, so far these forces have been commercial farmers and increasingly 
corporate agribusinesses. 
4. TWO COMPETING VIEWS OF SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURE 
Land reform should not automatically be equated with support for small-scale production. 
Indeed, in the first phase of the South African land reform programme, there was no real 
conception of a link between land reform and production aside from a vague idea that land 
reform beneficiaries might use the land to produce food for themselves. Although small-scale 
farming appeared in the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
associated policy documents in 1994, these positions were not followed through. The ANC’s 
1994 agricultural policy document (ANC, 1994a) spent a lot of time discussing support to 
emerging small-scale black farmers. But potential black farmers in South Africa had little access 
to land and land reform was a necessary precursor to rebuilding a substantial small-scale black 
farming class. Land reform was situated as the “central and driving force” of rural development 
in the RDP (ANC, 1994:20), and the ANC called for a 30% transfer of ownership of agricultural 
land in the first five years of political democracy (ANC, 1994:22).  
 
But the land reform programme was not designed to facilitate the expansion of this category of 
producers amongst beneficiaries, and support for black farmers was very patchy for at least the 
first decade after political democratisation. Budget analysis shows a sharp decline in support for 
agriculture as a whole, which only started increasing in real terms from 2003 (Greenberg, 
2010:2). In 1998 the total agricultural budget was only 46% of what it was in 1988 (Vink, et al., 
2012:5). This was a product both of the withdrawal of the state from agricultural support in 
particular, but also the general shrinking of government expenditure as the ANC tried to contain 
the debt overload inherited from apartheid (Hirsch, 2005). 
 
But there was an even more fundamental underlying issue. Neither civil society land 
organisations nor the commercial agricultural lobby prioritised small-scale agriculture. Most of 
the land NGOs were built on resistance to forced removals, based on a master narrative of ‘loss 
and restoration’ (Walker, 2008), leading them to prioritise restitution and tenure reform and a 
‘rights-based’ approach (Cousins, 2013b) and certainly were not driven by agricultural 
production concerns. For their part, commercial farmers were caught in the flow of the 
restructuring and deregulation that sharpened competition and raised the importance of 
economies of scale. Without a significant and active constituency lobbying for small-scale 
farmer support, it is unsurprising that government did not orient their policies in this direction. 
 
Sophia Murphy (2012:15-20) offers a useful typology of approaches to small-scale agriculture in 
current discourse globally (Table 1). The first approach views small-scale agriculture as an 
anachronism due to fade out of existence as the rationality of large-scale agriculture spreads. 
The second and third are variants of approaches to bring small-scale farmers into markets 
dominated by large-scale commercial production, either as a poverty reduction exercise (while 
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markets where small-scale production may have competitive advantages (e.g. in labour-
intensive horticultural production).  
Murphy’s fourth and fifth types remain far off the agenda in the mainstream approach to small-
scale black agriculture in South Africa: the fourth type considers small-scale agriculture as 
making business sense in its own right, and seeks to support the expansion of small-scale 
agriculture as a competitive alternative to large-scale agriculture in the market. The fifth 
approach aims to contest the logic of market-driven agricultural production and looks to small-
scale production as an alternative to capitalist systems of production and reproduction as a 
whole, rooted in food sovereignty.  
 
Based on Murphy’s typology, the RDP – and current mainstream thinking about small-scale 
agriculture – is clearly situated in the second and third variants, which see a minor role for 
small-scale agriculture in reducing poverty and possibly integrating a thin layer of commercial 
producers into formal markets, but which continues to view large-scale, increasingly 
concentrated production as the basis for food security in the future. I’ve drawn out the aspects 
of Murphy’s typology that deal with the different economic orientations or logics. However, the 
various reasons for supporting small-scale agriculture is ‘politically over-determined’ (as 
Andries du Toit has expressed it) in South Africa and do not necessarily have coherent economic 
logics underpinning them. Nevertheless, it is possible to allocate different positions broadly 
within economic logics. 
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In South Africa there are two competing views of the role of small-scale farming. The first is the 
mainstream approach adopted by agribusinesses and the commercial farming lobby. This is 
fundamentally based on the first of Murphy’s types (yesterday’s economy): large-scale 
commercial agriculture is the basis of food security, and economies of scale are a commercial 
imperative in the current global context (AgriSA, 2010). Small-scale agriculture doesn’t really 
have any meaningful role to play except maybe as a poverty reduction exercise. Since 
democratisation, government has not shown any substantial disagreement with this. Adopting a 
food security framework, government has emphasised the provision of social grants as a way of 
enabling the poor to access food through purchase. Government support for food production 
has followed two paths: food gardens as a welfare strategy run not by the Department of 
Agriculture but by the Department of Social Development as an adjunct to the provision of social 
grants; and very weak, fragmented and partial support for the development of black farmers. 
Post-1994 government policy, from the RDP onwards, recognised the bifurcated character of 
South African agriculture, between a dominant white commercial sector that produced most of 
the output, and on which food security depended, and a scrawny black ‘subsistence’ or (later) 
‘emerging’ farm sector that needed support to grow. Two beliefs lay beneath the resulting 
policy: i) that large-scale commercial sector is essential for food security in South Africa; and ii) 
that small-scale farming is either only good for subsistence/welfare or that a small section of 
these farmers can be supported to intersect with the large-scale commercial sector. 
 
The ANC in government supported the continuation of the commercial agricultural 
restructuring process without consideration for the impact on the creation of a black farming 
class, whether large-scale commercial or small-scale. Indeed, the logic was that deregulation 
would produce greater competition and open markets to new black farmers. Bayley (2000:58) 
argues that it was well understood that “market deregulation was necessary but not sufficient to 
realise government’s policy goals for the agricultural sector”. Amongst other things (trade policy 
consistent with domestic policy and a strong competition policy) he argues that “targeted 
assistance to small-scale farmers (whether land reform beneficiaries or located in the former 
homeland areas) was necessary to integrate them into the mainstream economy”. It is possible 
then to lay the blame for failure to develop a black commercial farming class at the door of 
government, and to sidestep the role of entrenched and concentrated private power in value 
chains and markets. The analysis in this paper suggests we look at weaknesses in both state and 
market to address transformation issues, not least because state and market/private power are 
intertwined. 
 
A related strand of thinking about small-scale agriculture sought to redefine small-scale farmers 
on the basis of turnover: hence 56% of white commercial farmers can be considered to be small-
scale producers if R500,000/year turnover is taken as the cut-off point (Kirsten, 2011a). Here 
we can see a shift to ‘room in the shade’ on the basis that the large number of white commercial 
‘small-scale’ farmers remains important, even if they contribute a declining share of the overall 
output. There are additional issues of the multifunctional value of retaining this large periphery 
of small-scale farmers, such as landscape maintenance and rural employment (although the 
latter is controversial, given the poor quality of these jobs as indicated in the report on farm 
worker wages and living standards highlighted by BFAP, 2012). This approach does attempt to 
depoliticise or deracialise the question of small-scale agriculture (albeit by sleight of hand, 
without doing anything to alter the agrarian structure or address past injustices). But of 
significance here is that it remains based on the assumption that the corporate core must 
remain untouched as the bulwark of food security in South Africa. 
 
However, the ANC simultaneously had a political agenda to increase black ownership in the 
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recognised the importance of realising this agenda even before the end of apartheid. This 
recognition was closely tied to the political legitimacy the ANC could bring to processes of 
economic restructuring. The issue was how the ‘justice’ agenda could be contained within a 
framework of markets and capitalism. In agriculture, there was agreement between the major 
farmer associations (the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), which converted into AgriSA, 
and which represented the core of the nomenklatura) to set up trusts to receive the assets of 
control boards which were being disbanded. Farmer associations had originally argued that 
assets belonged to farmers as a collective; while the ANC argued that state support historically 
meant they should be treated as public resources. A compromise was reached in the form of the 
trusts, which would use the assets to the benefit of the sectors they had been built up in, 
including support to black farmers. But the 1996 Marketing Act did not prescribe the precise 
nature of the structure of trusts, leaving it open to power struggles in each sector (Bayley, 
2000:50, 62-65). 
 
White business responded unevenly to the requirement for political legitimacy of economic 
restructuring processes. Not all were happy with any idea of economic sharing and tried to 
minimise this. But generally there was a strategic recognition of the need to engage with the 
government agenda to stabilise the social structure of accumulation. Ultimately it was in the 
interests of white business that government was able to maintain political control.  
 
Political pressure – from events in Zimbabwe and from inside South Africa, both on the basis of 
the ANC’s political imperatives and to some extent through civil society mobilisation around 
scrapping the willing buyer, willing seller land reform model -  saw agribusiness efforts to move 
more forcefully onto the terrain of black farmer support . The notion that large-scale 
commercial agriculture formed the basis for food security remained: indeed it was reinforced by 
the fact that agribusiness appeared better at developing workable solutions to black small-scale 
farmer support than the state. But there was renewed effort to integrate black farmers into 
niches, especially using a contract farming model based on experiences in sugar cane, poultry 
and cotton (even though the long-term sustainability of these was questionable; see for example 
Dubb 2013 on sugar and Pschorn-Strauss, 2005 on cotton). 
 
There was therefore a gradual shift to supporting black small-scale farmers, first through 
corporate social initiative (CSI)-type interventions focused on welfare on the margins (e.g. 
supporting food gardens) but later also through strategies of integration into formal value 
chains in some niches. This included mentorship to ‘train’ black farmers in capitalist production 
techniques, and integration into supermarket value chains in particular where small-scale 
production could meet required production standards with necessary technical support (e.g. 
fresh produce). Grain SA provides a very good example of these efforts, utilising its central 
position in the livestock-grain complex to leverage both corporate and state/parastatal 
resources (such as Agricultural Sector Education and Training Authority levies) to facilitate 
black commercial farmer development in the image of commercial white farming (Grain SA 
2013). Thus business moved between similar poles to government, between support for small-
scale production as a welfare intervention and recognition of possible synergies between small-
scale producers and corporate profitability in defined markets. More recently this has taken the 
form of public-private partnerships as government and the private sector find common ground 
around building a layer of commercial black farmers. 
 
Two big cases at the Competition Commission have shown these processes in action. In the 
Pioneer Hi-Bred-Pannar acquisition in the seed sector, Pioneer’s desire to create an 
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‘international research and technology hub’ for hybrid and genetically-modified (GM) seed 
production in South Africa for the southern African region was spun as a strategy to support 
small-scale black farmers to access better quality seed, and to create research capacity in South 
Africa to further these aims (Competition Appeal Court, 2012). In the Walmart-Massmart 
acquisition, Walmart agreed to a R100m supplier fund to assist local suppliers, including 
farmers, to meet the requirements for contracts with Walmart. It should be noted that both of 
these were strategies already being planned by the multinationals, and that they were merely 
spun as specific to South Africa’s requirements. A pilot in Limpopo aimed to support black 
farmers to sell to Walmart stores, and Walmart facilitated visits to Costa Rica for the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), including the Minister, to showcase 
their small farmer integration model. DAFF initially opposed the unconditional acquisition 
during competition hearings, arguing that it would undermine efforts to build a supply base in 
South Africa. A Farmer’s Weekly story in July 2012 shows photographs of DAFF Minister Tina 
Joemat-Pettersson wearing a Walmart cap on the sponsored tour. This epitomises the 
confluence of government and private sector agendas on the issue of building small-scale 
farmers. Joemat-Pettersson subsequently reversed her Department’s initial opposition to the 
acquisition, saying “DAFF is pursuing a strategy of linking small producers to sell their produce 
directly to the major retailers such as Walmart, Pick n Pay, Spar and other retailers. We are 
proud to be part of a partnership with Walmart/Massmart. Their programme offers the most 
comprehensive kind of assistance to smallholder farmers to my knowledge by a corporate 
company” (Joemat-Pettersson, 2012). While there may be value in these initiatives to link small-
scale black farmers into markets, questions remain about whether and how these interventions 
contribute to transforming the agrarian structure and agri-food systems to the benefit of the 
vast majority of producers who will remain outside these production contracts. 
 
Despite these partnerships and pilots to integrate small-scale farmers, they mostly remain on 
the margins. We are confronted again by the strong belief in the commercial agricultural sector 
that increasing scale is the only way rational forward in the face of global competition. Given 
government’s push for small-scale production, and the recognition of possible profitable 
interactions by the private sector in small niches, a small-scale approach is developing that does 
not challenge the inherited economic structure. Government itself does not have a vision 
outside the dominant framework of corporate agriculture with some smallholder integration 
where possible. Generally, these processes can be viewed as transformation from above: 
controlled process of selection of farmers and support to meet standards of quality, volume, etc 
defined by the corporate sector. 
 
On the other side of the divide are those who argue that small-scale agriculture has potential to 
make a sustainable contribution to improving rural livelihoods. Ben Cousins is probably the 
most prolific exponent of this argument that small-scale agriculture has potential, while 
recognising that agriculture is only one component of livelihood strategies and needs to be 
combined with support for other non-agricultural income-generating or livelihood activities. 
Subdivision of land and appropriate support, including developing local market infrastructure, 
are key to realising this potential (Cousins, 2013a; Cousins, 2013c). To some extent the 
government’s National Development Plan (NDP) pushes a similar argument, although the 
agricultural plan was designed to meet a pre-defined target for jobs created (1 million new 
jobs), and it is uncertain whether the proposals there are feasible given the global context of 
competition or the capacity in the Department of Agriculture. What distinguishes Cousins’ 
approach from the NDP is that the former is based on transformation from below (or what 
Cousins terms “accumulation from below”), whereas the NDP still sees the driving force as being 
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On the outer edge, some NGOs and local small-scale farmer associations have taken up the call 
for food sovereignty. Their argument is based on the social and ecological importance of a 
diverse production structure, with many people involved in productive activity. Food 
sovereignty is presented as a fundamental challenge to the corporate agrofood structure. 
Globally the argument is strongest where there are large, organised constituencies of small-
scale and family farmers advocating in defence of agri-food systems threatened with 
displacement by corporate encroachment. In South Africa, that encroachment took place 
decades ago and the challenge for the food sovereignty movement in South Africa is to rebuild 
some kind of small-scale family farm sector that incorporates a critical analysis of the existing 
agri-food system. In many countries where the concept of food sovereignty has taken root, the 
material base for such a movement currently exists in the widespread reliance on small-scale 
producers for food. In South Africa the material base has to be constructed along with the 
discourse. Government has ventured into this territory with the drafting of an agroecology 
strategy (DAFF, 2012a). But the strategy is not very clearly defined and drafts so far mainly 
offer a catalogue of production practices without any clear idea about how the strategy will 
relate to conventional agriculture and the dynamics of corporate controlled agri-food chains. It 
tends towards identifying agroecology with organic agriculture and adopts a niche market 
approach. There is also concern that the strategy is the pet project of one or two officials and 
does not have broader institutional buy-in. Nevertheless, it opens room for dialogue and does 
provide a potential platform for an agroecological strategy based on small-scale producers. 
Land reform and small-scale agricultural production 
Land reform as it unfolded was not designed to build small-scale production in any meaningful 
way, and remains ill-equipped to do so. Market-based redistribution (‘willing seller, willing 
buyer’) is the first constraint to a small-scale farmer strategy. In phase one it resulted in groups 
acquiring land not for any purpose other than this being the only way to accrue enough money 
to purchase the land. There was little consideration of how the land would be used. The result 
was a combination of settlement and some production, but with no production support. 
Beneficiaries were essentially left to get on with it themselves. Individuals in the groups 
sometimes did not even know each other before the land reform, sometimes causing competing 
visions and internal conflict. 
 
There are further two interconnected constraints built into the conceptualisation of land reform 
that has carried through all the phases. The first is the particular type of commercial orientation 
constructed on the basis of the notion of ‘viability’ (Cousins and Scoones, 2010) and efficient 
land size. Outsourced business plans have been built on this notion of viability regardless of 
what beneficiaries might have wanted to do on the land. The second and related constraint is 
the persistence of the transfer of entire commercial farms rather than the breaking up of these 
farms and the provision of appropriate support to enable smaller scale production, whether for 
own use, commercial production or a mix of the two. Some historical research shows how 
commercial farm boundaries were not set up with economically viable size in mind. Rather, 
large units were established, especially in ‘border’ areas, to act as a buffer between white 
settlers and areas still under African control (most of which became the core of the homelands) 
(Greenberg, 2011). 
 
These dimensions of the land reform programme made more sense in the second phase, where 
the focus was on trying to build a black commercial farming class based on the historical large-
scale white farming model inherited from apartheid. This aimed to replicate the commercial 
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agricultural system merely with change in racial ownership, and was the first round of BEE 
which was later widely criticised as supporting the rapid enrichment of a very small elite. 
 
The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP), launched in 2000, did 
suggest the need for land reform for small-scale farming, proposing that “a land reform program 
that allows small farmers with low or moderate incomes to purchase entire large farms (in 
sections) or under-utilised portions of large farms contributes to agricultural growth and 
stimulates the local economy more than would agricultural growth from the large farm sector” 
(ODP, 2000:22). However this idea only filtered through to the land reform programme in 
selective fragments: land reform continued to transfer large farms, which aligns with one part of 
the ISRDP proposal (small farmers to purchase entire large farms), but did not adopt the next 
step of subdividing large farms (sections or under-utilised portions). This was one of the 
fundamental inconsistencies between the land reform programme and a putative small-scale 
farmer strategy (Lahiff, 2007). 
 
Despite the apparent shift in focus in the third phase to embracing a small-scale farming model, 
policy proposals around land have not caught up with this. The transfer of whole farms 
continues. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act of 1970 remains in place despite a 1998 law 
repealing it. The original Act aimed to prevent subdivision of agricultural land into unviable 
economic units, but the repeal Act argued that it is not appropriate for government to interfere 
in the determination of the size of agricultural land. Instead, this should be left to the 
agricultural sector, land users and the market, because there are other zoning mechanisms to 
protect valuable agricultural land. Government recognised that the original Act interfered with 
land reform in particular, and thus agricultural land subdivided for land reform does not have to 
comply with the legislation (Franz, 2010:67-8). However, this only makes it more surprising 
that the state has failed to utilise the Repeal Act as well as the Development Facilitation Act and 
other pieces of legislation (such as the Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources 
Bill of 2003) to divide farms up to facilitate small-scale production. As a result, despite the 
rhetoric of support for small-scale farming and widening the productive base, land reform in 
practice has produced minimal change to the agrarian structure.  
Smallholder farmer support 
In 2007 the ANC resolved to “implement large-scale programmes to establish new smallholders 
and improve the productivity of existing small-scale and subsistence farmers”. More than five 
years later, what has come of this? 
 
Support for small-scale farmers refers specifically to support for black farmers who have had to 
break in to established markets controlled by entrenched interests. As indicated above, this is 
caught between welfarist and corporatist dynamics. The majority of small-scale farmers are 
seen as subsistence producers, with support oriented to providing basic inputs (seeds, tools, in 
some cases fencing) with no consideration of markets. Then some support is provided to ‘scale 
up’ black farmers to compete in the market with white farmers. Farmers in homeland areas are 
gradually being recognised as having some market potential. However, until recently they have 
generally been ignored as the apartheid institutional support structure was dismantled and 
bantustan agricultural schemes established under late apartheid consequently collapsed. Of 
most importance here are the irrigation schemes (van Avebeke et al., 2011) and bantustan 
agricultural development corporations (Mthethwa & Callear, 1996; Johnston et al., 1997). 
 
The logic was that deregulation would open space for new entrants into the market, including in 
downstream activities (milling, processing), with the expectation that ‘the market’ would 
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concentration that meant any new entrants were forced to compete with entrenched powerful 
businesses. In this period, the new government’s major concern was macro-economic stability. 
 
There was an ongoing role for the state, but it was framed in terms of facilitating an ‘enabling 
environment’ for private sector functioning. Limited resources meant concentration on 
‘essential services’ that the state was required to co-ordinate, especially quality control and 
standards. The state also retained some responsibility for other support functions, such as 
maintaining an R&D infrastructure, and to some extent the provision of extension and credit. In 
the latter two cases, the state was to focus on ‘emerging’ black farmers while established white 
large-scale commercial farmer support rapidly shifted to the private sector on a ‘user pays’ 
basis. Those who could afford good service got it, while those who could not afford to pay for 
support had to make do with a denuded public support infrastructure. This is one of the 
fundamental problems with privatisation: it segments the market, allowing private service 
providers to ‘cherry pick’ those who can afford quality services, while weakening public 
provision of these services to the remainder. 
 
Although it was still located in the public sector, R&D remained oriented towards large-scale 
agricultural needs. The state continued playing a role mainly in maintaining R&D infrastructure, 
while content was outsourced to companies who could pay researchers. For example, in order 
to secure funds to continue functioning, the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) needed to 
maintain germplasm banks on behalf of private companies as their main source of income (ACB, 
2012). Later the state began sponsoring small public programmes on the margins for small-
scale/subsistence farmer outreach. 
 
Extension services were similarly split between a denuded public service and privatised 
commercial services. Extension was already historically split between high quality support for 
the commercial sector and low quality support for small-scale black producers in the homelands 
(ARC, 2011). As part of the general shrinking of state support in the period of belt-tightening 
and GEAR (the national government’s 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy), 
the homeland extension service was gutted. As part of the reduction in the government 
workforce, extension officers were offered early retirement with the state paying out, resulting 
in far fewer extension workers with limited resources for retraining or for physical movement 
to farmers. Agricultural colleges were rationalised and shifted from training extension 
practitioners to training farmers directly in order to get the required numbers. The Broadening 
Access to Agriculture Thrust (BATAT) in the mid-1990s had called for the strengthening of 
agricultural curricula and expansion of opportunities for training, but an agricultural education 
and training strategy was only launched in 2002 (Phuhlisani, 2008:12). 
 
Historically there were 3,000 extension officers for white commercial farmers and 1,000 poorly-
equipped and poorly-trained extension officers for black farmers in the homelands. Most of 
these latter extension officers focused on the capital-intensive irrigation schemes (Lipton, cited 
in Phuhlisani, 2008:7). From 1987 to 1993 the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
ran the Farmer Support Programme (FSP), a package of support to individual small-scale 
farmers in the homelands including extension. The programme was designed to respond to the 
limits of the large-scale centralised project model the DBSA had adopted until that time (van 
Rooyen, et al., 1987). From an extension point of view, reviews concluded the extension support 
provided by the FSP was mostly of poor quality, there was a disconnection between extension 
and research given that research focused on the commercial sector, the FSP used outdated 
extension methodologies, and focused on efforts to encourage high input use that over-extended 
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resource-poor farmers (Hayward & Botha, 1995). A review off the FSP in the Venda and Lebowa 
homelands revealed that just 2.6% of expenditure went to extension and training from 1987 to 
1991 (Kirsten, et al., 1993:48). Despite inefficiencies and lack of co-ordination in the extension 
services provided, the authors found positive benefits in yields and knowledge for those with 
access to extension services. The DBSA abandoned the programme after 1994 when its focus 
shifted to local government support (Phuhlisani, 2008:8). 
 
In 2009 there were 2,210 extension officers. Eighty percent had a diploma or lower 
qualification, while government norms and standards require a degree or higher (DAFF, 
2009:3). Most remaining extension officers were located in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape and then 
KwaZulu-Natal, and extension officers in these three provinces also had the lowest levels of 
education (DAFF, 2009:52). Government norms and standards call for one extension officer per 
250 up to 500 people (depending on crop type and character of farmer, i.e. ‘subsistence’, ‘semi-
commercial’ or ‘commercially-oriented’, according to DAFF categories). A DAFF survey found 
between 17% (E Cape) and 72% (Free State) of extension officers were serving 400 or fewer 
farmers. But these were unevenly distributed. There was a 1:21 ratio of extension officers to 
commercial farmers compared with a ratio of 1:857 for ‘subsistence’ (i.e. black small-scale) 
farmers (Phuhlisani, 2008:12). Extrapolating from the figures of farmers identified in its survey, 
DAFF indicated that there should be between 3,858 and 7,715 extension officers in the country 
(DAFF, 2009:47-50). 
 
Retraining of extension workers was a key requirement. Historically workers were trained in 
transfer-of-technology (ToT) methodologies, where new products were developed in 
laboratories away from farmers and then brought to farmers to adopt or reject without 
alternatives on offer. The 1995 White Paper on Agriculture critiqued this approach and called 
for a more participatory approach with researchers working directly with farmers in the field, 
and it also recognised farmers’ tacit knowledge. But government failed to act on this, partly a 
product of the reduction of resources in government, but also the overarching orientation 
towards large-scale commercial agriculture as the primary path towards food security, which 
meant extension to small-scale black farmers was not a priority. As input corporations 
(Monsanto, Syngenta etc) began seeing the possibility of building markets in homeland areas, 
they used the under-resourced public extension service as sales agents for private products. 
Corporations offered training to extension officers in the use of their products, and the 
extension workers went out to sell it to the farmers at no overhead cost to the companies. 
 
There were some efforts at renewing the extension service, but this is still in its infancy in a 
context of limited resources. Sporadic efforts were made at participatory or farmer-to-farmer 
pilots at provincial level (e.g. BASED in Limpopo, or work with Prolinnova in KZN and 
elsewhere), but these were never scaled up. The overall mindset remained in line with the 
commercial agricultural model of transfer of technology (Worth, 2008), accompanied by a “high 
degree of institutional inertia” (Phuhlisani, 2008:25). 
 
The 2008 Extension Recovery Plan calls for skills upgrading for 1,000 officers over 5 years, and 
is accompanied by a growth in the budget for extension services from R100m in 2008/09 to 
R331m in 2011/12 and projected R390m in 2014/15. New targets have been set of 2,500 to 
3,500 extension officers per year accessing grants to “register with professional bodies to 
improve their professionalism and accountability” (National Treasury, 2012:16-17). We will 
need to wait to see if this improves services. In the meantime, a survey of households conducted 
by Tshintsha Amakhaya (a coalition of 10 land and agricultural support NGOs)  in the Western 
and Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo, most of which had access to some land for 
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responding households indicated any interaction with extension services in the past 12 months. 
This was as high as 41% in KZN, but only 7% in Limpopo, 9% in Western Cape and 19% in 
Eastern Cape (Tshintsha Amakhaya, 2012). The current opening of dialogue around the 
formulation of a new policy for extension services may be a good opportunity to bring 
participatory farmer-to-farmer methodologies to the fore. 
 
Production finance was provided for by a range of state and statutory institutions under 
apartheid, including the Land Bank, Agricultural Credit Board and the co-ops which provided 
their members with credit. Black producers were left out. The Land Bank was previously one of 
the beneficiaries of the system of prescribed assets, where the state compelled investments 
including Land Bank bills, bonds and securities (Bayley, 2000:40). But following financial 
deregulation from late 1970s the Land Bank moved to market-based interest rates, and 
currently raises funds from money markets in competition with other lenders. This resulted in a 
shift in the loan book from the public sector to the private sector in the form of the commercial 
banks. Commercial banks’ share of agricultural debt rose steadily, from 30% in 1985 to almost 
58% in 2011 (DAFF, 2012:83). This growth in market share came mainly at the expense of the 
agricultural co-ops, which went from 25% of the total loan book in 1985 to just 10% in 2011. 
This is a product of the privatisation of the co-ops and a shift of focus amongst most of the 
former co-ops away from financing. 
 
The Land Bank has continued to play an important role in agricultural financing, but most of this 
goes to large-scale commercial operations. The Land Bank’s share of total farming debt actually 
rose from 21% in 1985 to 25% in 2011 (DAFF, 2012:83), but with a sharp dip from 2002 to 
2008 where it experienced major internal problems, including corruption. The Bank’s lending 
activities are split between business and corporate banking, retail commercial and retail 
emerging market. The latter is for small-scale farmers “without a good credit profile”. In the 
2010/11 financial year, 72% of loans went to business and corporate clients and 24% was split 
between ‘commercial’ and ‘emerging’ retail clients (at the time of the annual report from where 
this information was drawn, the distinction between the two retail categories was not yet 
made). The remaining 4% went to land for development (Land Bank, 2011:166). In 2011 CEO 
Phakamani Hadebe indicated that up to R1bn would go to ‘emerging’ farmers over 2 years 
under the Retail Emerging Market unit (Vollgraaff, 2011). Using latest loan book figures from 
the 2010/11 annual report, we can deduce that approximately one-eighth of retail loans would 
go to emerging farmers (presumably mostly black farmers of any scale without sufficient 
collateral to get a loan), or somewhere around 3% of the Land Bank’s total loan book. While we 
should acknowledge that the Land Bank has struggled with repayments of loans to resource-
poor black farmers – Hadebe indicates 58% of the loan book to the emerging market segment 
was non-performing, compared with just 6% for the commercial and business and corporate 
units combined (Vollgraaff, 2011) – this hardly constitutes a radical orientation towards small-
scale farmers in public sector financing. In 2012 the Land Bank set a target for 15% of the loan 
book for “development lending” by 2016 (Land Bank, 2012:6), suggesting a gradual shift 
towards finance for small-scale farmers. 
 
As the cases of R&D, extension and production finance indicate, agricultural support to black 
small-scale farmers has not improved significantly in the past twenty years. Although there have 
been sporadic attempts to provide this kind of support, these efforts have suffered from a lack of 
an overarching framework to support small-scale farmers. Instead, support to small-scale 
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5. CONCLUSIONS: AGRARIAN CHANGE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
AGRI-FOOD SYSTEM 
This paper has advanced the argument that government rhetoric on supporting small-scale 
farming in South Africa has not translated into practice. On the contrary, government’s actual 
policies in both land reform and agricultural support have favoured a large-scale farming model. 
 
Land reform has failed to transfer land fast enough to create the basis for small-scale agriculture 
as an option. Where land has been transferred, early policy hampered the possibility of surplus 
production by dumping large numbers of people on farms without clearly defining allocation of 
land to individuals for production. The practical outcome in the earlier phase was a compulsion 
to collective farming but without necessary support forthcoming. Alternatively commercial 
‘whole farm’ business plans were drawn up which were beyond the reach of the vast majority of 
beneficiaries. Thus the approach to land reform created obstacles to the pursuance of small-
scale farming strategy. Later policy has stayed with the approach of transferring large farms 
rather than subdividing and ensuring appropriate support for production. 
 
For its part, agricultural policy was built on a bifurcated agrarian structure without seeking to 
transcend it. ‘Subsistence’ farming was recognised but received very limited support except in 
the form of welfarist interventions for most of the past 18 years. Otherwise efforts were made, 
especially in the past decade, to commercialise small-scale farmers either through collective 
projects aimed at niche markets at high expense, or more recently through efforts to integrate 
small-scale farmers into corporate value chains with assistance from the private sector, thus 
targeting only a small minority of potential surplus-producing black farmers able to meet 
corporate-defined standards. 
 
These efforts at small-scale farmer support are situated in a macro-economic framework that 
explicitly seeks to strengthen large-scale commercial agriculture in the face of global 
competition, as the examples of the privatisation of the commercial assets built up on the basis 
of state support under apartheid, and trade and investment policies that have led to the further 
concentration of productive assets show. Despite the rhetoric of land redistribution and support 
for black small-scale farmers, therefore, state interventions have consolidated corporate power 
in agri-food chains. 
 
The ANC in government has been either unwilling or too timid to take the plunge and 
wholeheartedly endorse a small-scale farmer strategy. It is held back by the idea that large-scale 
commercial agriculture is the only way of ensuring food security in South Africa, reinforced by 
the constant advice of experts with a material stake in the continuation of large-scale 
commercial agriculture. There is an embrace of the modernisation paradigm with the implicit 
acceptance that peasant or small-scale agriculture is obsolete. In this light, the small-scale 
approach in practice is a combination of welfare for most small producers (with the underlying 
belief that creating jobs will solve rural poverty – and jobs are best created by large-scale 
industry rather than small businesses, hence very limited small business support) and a 
strategy for a thin layer of commercial small-scale producers to get into niche markets tied to 
corporate agri-food value chains. 
 
Nevertheless, the debate has opened up again in recent years. The question facing us now is 
whether small-scale farming and decentralised and deconcentrated economic activity is a 
feasible option as a way both to ensure enough food and fibre is produced for the needs of the 
population, and as a way to transform the agrarian structure to a more equitable distribution of 
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farmers and their communities), then government must take the plunge to provide the kind of 
support required to realise that vision so it has a meaningful effect on the agrarian structure. 
This requires a rapid transfer of land, breaking up of land units, provision of support to enable 
these units to be used productively (especially water and intermediate storage and processing 
technologies, and support for local systems of distribution based on what already exists in the 
‘informal’ sector), and a breaking up of the over-centralised and over-concentrated agri-food 
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